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11 Introduction
When Europe with its on average high unemployment is compared with the
United States where unemployment is substantially lower European rigidity
and American °exibility are often emphasized. One of the institutions that
is potentially incompatible with labor market °exibility is employment pro-
tection. There is a di®erence in employment protection between the US and
Europe but also within Europe there is a big variety across countries. From
anOECD (1999) overview it appears that southern Europeancountries stand
out for having relatively strict employment regulation, along withFrance and
Germany. At the other extreme, regulation is least restrictive in the United
States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. Di®erences in em-
ployment protection across countries are not very much related to di®erences
in unemployment rates. However, as far as employment protection is con-
cerned it is not only unemployment that matters but also economic growth.
Employment protection may have an e®ect on labor productivity through
the slowing down of the reallocation from old and declining sectors to new
and dynamic sectors. Still, as Nickell and Layard (1999) indicate this ef-
fect will most likely be limited because quits already allow for a substantial
downward adjustment of the workforce of a ¯rm without any costs. They
emphasize that instead of having a negative e®ect on labor productivity, em-
ployment protection may stimulate growth. The explanation they provide is
that productivity improvements depend on the cooperation of workers, while
also substantive participation requires training. Therefore, employment pro-
tection stimulates growth because it increases job tenure and thus provides
an incentive for job training.1 To illustrate this they present cross-country
estimates of productivity growth from which it appears that employment
protection is the only institution that has a positive e®ect whereas the other
labor market institutions do not seem to have any e®ect on growth.
Employment protection involves costs for employers that want to adjust
1Employment protection may be provided through labor laws but also through the
private market, collective bargaining agreements and court decisions.
2their workforce. Employment protection is also a commitment device of the
employer, which stimulates workers to make productivity enhancing invest-
ments in¯rm speci¯chumancapital. This trade-o® betweenadjustment costs
and productivity growth is the focal point of our study. If employers would
not o®er employment protection, workers can be ¯red on the spot. Without
employment protection workers severely underinvest in relationship-speci¯c
capital due to a hold-up problem. Employment protection reduces the prob-
ability that workers are dismissed after they have made an e®ort. Hence,
employment protection might be desirable both from the point of view of the
worker (job stability and wage gains) and of the ¯rm (productivity gains).
Nocontract is ever-lasting inthe sense that employers o®er workers contracts
that ensure the workers of a job until they retire. On the arrival of negative
productivity shocks employers may decide to ¯re aworker despite of the costs
involved. Even if employers would o®er all workers ex ante the same con-
tract, i.e. a contract with the same ¯ring costs theremay be di®erences in job
tenure related to the productivity of the worker. Low productivity workers
are more vulnerable to negative external shocks. Conditional on a particular
shock high productivity workers may keep their job while low productivity
workers are made redundant.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section2 we provide an overview ofstyl-
ized facts onemployment protection. There are substantial di®erences across
countries. Many countries have substantially changed their employment pro-
tection regulation towards more °exibility. From the empirical studies it
appears that employment protection does not a®ect unemployment much
but may have e®ects on labor market dynamics and economic growth. Theo-
retical studies analyze employment protection from di®erent angles. Most of
the theoretical studies consider employment protection as a cost incurred by
the ¯rm. Productivity is present in some of them but is treated exogenously.
The trade-o® between costs and productivity gains from employment pro-
tection constituted the originality of our paper. In Section 4 we present our
theoretical matching model, where initially employment regulation is intro-
3duced with one type of contract. We assume that productivity is uncertain
while there is some information about the potential suitability of the worker
for the job at the time ¯rm and worker meet. On the basis of this potential
suitability employers decide whether or not to o®er a contract and condi-
tional on the o®ered contract workers decide whether or not they will make
a productivity enhancing investment. Employment protection enhances the
incentives of the workers to invest in human capital in order to reduce the
probability of being ¯red. Hence, when the ¯rm o®ers a contract with high
separation costs, it commits itself to a stable employment relationship, i.e.
it o®ers a guarantee to the worker that she won't be easily ¯red. Before pro-
duction starts the productivity of the match is fully revealed. Then, either
the ¯rm and the worker ¯nd it e±cient to separate or production starts. We
show that for a given productivity there is an optimal degree of employment
protection. Ifthere is aproductivity distribution it is welfare improving if dif-
ferent types of contracts, i.e. contracts with di®erent ¯ring costs, are o®ered.
In Section 5 we present simulations to illustrate the main characteristics of
our model. We show that the optimal employment protection depends on
the productivity of the workers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Employment protection - stylized facts
Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring and ¯r-
ing. It may concern rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for us-
ing temporary or ¯xed-term contracts, training requirements but also re-
dundancy procedures, mandated pre-noti¯cation periods and severance pay-
ments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work
schemes (see OECD (1999) for an overview). The common element in these
rules is that they increase adjustment costs and thus job tenures.
When considering the potential welfare e®ect of employment protection
we are especially interested in di®erences between countries in terms of the
strictness of employment protection and the range of contracts o®ered in
4terms of temporary or more or less permanent nature.2 Keeping in mind
that the de¯nitions and regulations governing temporary and long-term em-
ploymentdi®er across countriesandchangedover time, we presentsome basic
trends in the development of employment protection regulation of \perma-
nent" and temporary contracts.
OECD (1999) gives a nice overview of the major changes in the two main
components of employment protection: traditional open-end contracts and
temporary employment. We present the indicators of the strictness of em-
ployment protection regulation in Table 1. We rank the countries according
to the strictness of the regulation protecting regular contracts. As shown in
the ¯rst column of Table 1 English speaking countries are the most °exible.
Then come the countries from continental Europe, Northern Europe and ¯-
nally, Southern Europe. By and large, the overall strictness with respect
to the regulation of temporary employment, shown in the second column of
Table 1 has the same pattern. The last two decades have been marked by
signi¯cant liberalizations in the use of ¯xed-term contracts in countries that
sometimes had very stringent regulations. Among them, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain eased, for some of them con-
siderably, the legal restrictions on recourse to various forms of temporary
employment. An important step in these reforms was the allowance of the
use of temporary contracts for non-temporary activities. Reforms in the em-
ployment protection system have sometimes been accompanied by reforms
of the social security system. For example, in order to promote the use of
¯xed-term contracts, the Italian government established ¯scal incentives for
2Temporary employment covers in general two categories of contracts: ¯xed-term con-
tracts and temporary work agency (TWA) contracts. Fixed duration contracts are em-
ployment relationships concluded directly between the employer and the worker. TWA
contracts are employment relationships between a temporary work agency and the worker,
the latter working for and under the control of a user ¯rm (Peeters (1999)). We ignore
temporary work agencies because these focus on the relationship between two ¯rms. See
Delsen (1995) for an overview of the various de¯nitions of temporary employment across
OECD countries.
5the employer in the form of social security tax relief (Adam and Canziani
(1998)).
There are several reasons for the existence of temporary contracts. First,
temporary employment is often consideredas away of providing °exibility to
the ¯rms, i.e. allowing them to adjust employment with relatively low costs
to the variations in demand (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). The most tra-
ditional and broadly accepted reason for using temporary contracts remains
linked to the type of activity (seasonal or limited in duration). Temporary
contracts may also be used as a step in the screening process towards a per-
manent employment relationship, or as a form of active labor market policy
(OECD, 1999).3 The growth of temporary employment may also have been
stimulated by changes in the labor supply. The increased participation of
women in the labor force is often considered as an important factor in the
growth of temporary employment (OECD (1999)). Finally, there are stud-
ies focusing on the role of other institutional characteristics, e.g. Golden
and Appelbaum (1992) who suggest that a reduction in the union bargain-
ing power has enhanced the growth of temporary contracts. Their argument
is that when labor's bargaining strength is high, ¯rms are hindered to add
temporary rather than permanent employees.
The incidence of temporary employment is shown in the third column of
Table 1. This incidence is relatively small in most of the OECD countries,
with the exception of Australia and Spain. Furthermore, the evolution of
the share of temporary employment has been quite stable in the majority of
countries. Nevertheless, it increased signi¯cantly in Australia, France, the
Netherlands and Spain and decreased in Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and
Portugal. The variation in temporary employment may have to do with its
3The majority of temporary employed was employed the year before (OECD, 1996).
However there is a reasonable part (varying between 8.7% in Spain and 31.9 % in Luxem-
bourg, 1994) that was not participating to the labor market. When we consider the status
of temporary employed one year later, it appears that two-thirds are still under a tempo-
rary contract in Spain and Germany, while an important proportion of them bene¯ts from
a permanent contract in France (31.7%) and Great Britain (25.3%).
6attractiveness relative to permanent contracts. Bentolila and Dolado note
that the share of temporary employment in total employment is the highest
in countries where traditional arrangements are very rigid.
Finally, temporary employment is unequally spread among the popula-
tion and sectors of activities. Bentolila and Dolado argue that temporary
employment is prevalent among people with an unstable attachment to the
labor force. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers are over-represented in this
type of employment. De Grip et al. (1997) note that sixty-three percent of
all temporary employed are in low-skilled occupations. Temporary matches
would therefore be less productive. One of the explanations suggested by
Bentolila and Dolado is that ¯xed-term contracts would be associated with
low investments in human capital and less e®ort from the workers. We argue
in this paper that the relationship between productivity and temporary em-
ployment goes also the other way around: It would be optimal to o®er short
duration contracts to low productive matches.
3 Employment protection - previous studies
3.1 Empirical studies
The relationship between employment protection and unemployment has
been studied frequently in the context of an international comparison of
labor market institutions. Nickell (1998) for example concludes on the basis
of a comparison of 20 OECD countries that employment protection has no
e®ect on the unemployment rate. Scarpetta (1996) ¯nds that employment
protection increases unemployment and extends the period of employment
adjustment. Bertola (1992) ¯nds no relationship between employment ad-
justment costs and the level of unemployment. Elmeskov et al. (1998) ¯nd
that employment protection increases unemployment in countries with an
intermediary level of corporatism. Belot and Van Ours (2001) ¯nd that em-
ployment protection has a negative e®ect on unemployment when bargaining
7is at the ¯rm level. Nickell and Layard (1999) scrutinize empirical evidence
on the relationship between labor market institutions and economic perfor-
mance. As far as unemployment is concernedthey advocate a focus on unions
and social security systems. The negative e®ect of unions can be reduced by
encouraging product market competition. Social security systems can be im-
proved by linking bene¯ts to active labor market programs that move people
from welfare to work. Nickell and Layard conclude that time spent worrying
about strict labor market regulations, employment protection and minimum
wages is probably time largely wasted. TheOECD (1999) alsoconcludes that
employment protection has little or no e®ect on overall unemployment. Em-
ployment protection regulation does seem to in°uence the dynamics of the
labor market and in particular unemployment °ows (Bentolila and Bertola
(1990)). The rates of jobcreation and job destruction onthe other hand seem
to be less sensitive to employment protection. They do not di®er strongly
between North-America and European countries, suggesting that the role of
employment protection regulation is small.
As indicated in the introduction Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude from
a cross-country comparison of the e®ects of labor market institutions on
economic growth that only employment protection matters. This is in line
with a cross-country analysis in OECD (1999), which shows that workers on
temporary contracts are less likely to be trained.
3.2 Theoretical studies
The relationship between employment protection and labor market perfor-
mance has been studied from di®erent angles.4 Bentolila and Dolado (1994)
for example suggest anextension of the insider-outsider model to analyze the
4In this overview, we restrict ourselves to the direct e®ects of employment protection.
There are some studies that consider the interactions of employment protection with other
labor market institutions. Coe and Snower (1997) analyze systematically all kind of the-
oretical interactions between various labor market institutions. Bertola and Rogerson
(1997) suggest that the e®ects of employment protection depend on the wage institutions.
8case of Spain. The basic idea is that unionized permanent workers, dominat-
ing the wage bargaining of all workers, see their bargaining power increasing
with the share of temporary employment. Indeed, the presence of a bu®er of
°exible employees lowers the likelihood that insiders will lose their jobs and
thereby increases their bargaining power. The consequence is a widespread
increase in wages damaging labor market performance.
Other studies analyze the e®ect of employment protection in the con-
text of labor market °ows. Boeri (1999) attempts to reconcile the empirical
evidence of relatively high destruction rates and low unemployment in°ows
in Europe with the theoretical implications of the equilibrium labor market
°ows literature. He argues that employment protection actually increases the
proportion of job-to-job shifts, i.e. a large number of workers move directly
to another job, without experiencing unemployment. Holmlund and Linden
(1993) consider a similar model where employed have a chance to avoid un-
employment at the end of a long-term employment relationship, by ending
up in a temporary public job. From this job they search for another job and
compete with unemployed.
Wasmer (1999) argues that the share of temporary contracts relative to
the share of long-term contracts depends on the productivity growth rate.
High growth rates make long-term contracts attractive to ¯rms. Downturns
are associated with a shift towards temporary contracts. The co-existence of
two types of contracts is guaranteed by a decreasing matching e±ciency of
the vacancies of one type when the number of vacancies of this type is rising.
There is a threshold for the growth rate, above what the productivity of the
match is so highthere are only long-term vacancies posted. Employment pro-
tection makes sense here because it enables ¯rms to protect high productive
matches. Productivity determines therefore the optimal contract the ¯rms
should o®er. But it enters the model exogenously. Employment protection
enables the ¯rms to keep high productive matches but does not have a direct
e®ect on productivity itself. We ¯nd this e®ect also in our model, but we
argue that the relationship also goes the other way around: The protection
9of contracts stimulate the productivity of the corresponding matches.
Hogan andRagan(1997)alsomodel employment protectionin amatching
framework. The provision of job security is de¯ned as the proportion of ¯rms
o®ering a secure contract rather than a risky contract, where risky contracts
are characterized by a higher layo® rate. They use a matching function with
increasing returns-to-scale which generates multiple equilibria. On the one
hand, when the proportion of ¯rms o®ering job security is small, °ows into
and out ofunemployment are largeandso is thearrival rateof an unemployed
to a vacancy. This reinforces the attractiveness of risky contracts. On the
other hand, alotofemployment protectiongenerates arelatively small arrival
rate, which makes it more attractive for ¯rms to o®er secure contracts.
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) focus on the relationship between employment
protection and skills. Employment protection gives workers incentives to in-
vest in ¯rm-speci¯c skills, while the absence of employment protection would
stimulate investments in general, portable skills.
All in all, we conclude that most of the theoretical studies consider em-
ployment protectionas a cost incurred by the ¯rm5. The gains for the worker
associated with employment protection concerns the stability of the employ-
ment relationship and the increased wage (insider e®ect). As we will describe
in more detail in the next subsection, we add to this the productivity enhanc-
ing e®ect. Productivity is present in other studies on employment protection
but is then not directly in°uenced by the type of employment protection. It
can be an aspect determining the contract choice (as in Wasmer (1999)) but
basically once the ¯rm and the worker have met, the future of their relation-
ship depends on exogenous events. Our model combines the cost-aspect of
employment protection with its in°uence on the behavior of the partners (in
particular of the workers) within the employment relationship. This intro-
duces a trade-o® between productivity gains and costs that is not present in
other studies.
5Welfare e®ects of severance payments and notices of termination are investigated in
Pissarides (2001) and Lazear (1990).
104 The model
This section presents a model formalizing the idea that ¯ring costs stimulate
¯rm speci¯c training by the employee and hence can be welfare enhancing.
To make this point most forcefully, we assume that ¯ring costs are a pure
waste (e.g. paper work involved in ¯ring an employee). In subsection 4.5 we
consider ¯ring costs as a transfer (either to employee or government). The
exact form of the ¯ring cost a®ects the nature of the contractual incomplete-
ness we need to assume in order to get the positive welfare e®ect of ¯ring
costs. Hence we postpone the discussion on contracts to section 4.5 as well.
We use a one shot version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching
model. Similar one shot versions have been used by Boone and Bovenberg
(2002) and Hosios (1990). This simpli¯cation allows us to introduce an ad-
ditional decision margin (e®ort choice of a worker) while we can still derive
analytical results. The model consists of four stages of which the timing is
as follows.
At t = 0, ¯rms post vacancies v at a cost c per vacancy and workers
supply inelastically one unit of search intensity.6 We model workers on the
unit interval [0;1] with measure one. The number of workers and ¯rms that
match is determined by a matching function m(u;v) where the number of
unemployed u in this one shot game equals the total mass of workers, u = 1.
De¯ning market tightness as µ =
v
u, we ¯nd that µ = v and we write the
matching function as m(µ) = m(1;µ). We make the usual assumptions that
m(0) = 0;m0 (µ) > 0;m00(µ) < 0 and
m(µ)
µ is decreasing in µ. Once the
worker and the ¯rm are matched the suitability of the worker for the job, x,
is revealed. In this section the suitability x is the same for everyone. Below
6One could endogenize workers' search e®ort by introducing a search cost function for
workers. This would complicate notation but does not a®ect the results. The reason for
this is as follows. In this type of model, agents tend to search too little because part of
the surplus created goes to the government as tax revenue. Firing costs in this context
raise the wage for the worker and hence stimulates search. Hence the welfare enhancing
e®ect of ¯ring costs is strengthened by endogenizing workers' search e®ort.
11we explore what happens if x di®ers between workers ex post.
Because here everyone has the same suitability x, every worker who is
matched with a ¯rm gets a contract and the contract stipulates a ¯ring
cost cf.7 The fraction (1 ¡ m(µ)) of workers that are not matched, stay
unemployed and receive unemployment bene¯t b ¸ 0.
At t = 1 the worker invests e®ort e at cost ° (e) to raise his productivity
in this match. Because this is a one-shot model, this e®ort e is ¯rm speci¯c.
We assume that e cannot be contracted and that the cost is borne by the
worker. One can think here of e®ort invested by the worker to get to know
the ¯rm, the procedures used, e®ort to help colleagues or e®ort invested in a
formal training program. As noted above, we come back to the contractual
problems surrounding e in section 4.5.
After this e®ort e has been sunk, the industry conditions " are revealed
at t = 2. The industry shock " 2 < is randomly distributed with density
function g(:) and distribution function G(:). Weassume the followingsimple
relationbetweenthesuitability for thejob, x, thee®ort choice, e, the industry
shock, ", and total output of the match y:
y = x + e+ " (1)
After " has been revealed, it may be the case that the worker and ¯rm decide
to split up if " is rather low. In that case, the ¯rm pays the ¯ring cost cf
and the worker becomes unemployed. These unemployed workers receive an
unemployment bene¯t b (just as their fellow workers that did not match with
a ¯rm at t = 0).
The worker and ¯rm combinations that do not separate produce output
y at t = 3. Further, the ¯rm and the worker bargain about the wage rate.
We use ¯nal output as numeraire and assume there are no other production
costs than labor costs.
7Strictly speaking there is also the possibility that x is so low that no one gets a
contract. Since x is known ex ante this implies that no vancancies are posted at t = 0.
We ignore this irrelevant case and assume that x is big enough.
12In the following subsections, we solve the model using backward induc-
tion. First, we solve for the wage rate and pro¯ts, then for workers' e®ort
choice e and ¯nally for the number of vacancies posted by the ¯rms.
4.1 Wages and pro¯ts
We assume that the surplus y is divided by the worker and the ¯rm using





¯(y ¡ (1+ t)w ¡ T + cf)
1¡¯
where ¯ (1¡¯) is the worker's (¯rm's) bargaining power, b is the unemploy-
ment bene¯t level and thus the worker's fall back position, t and T denote
components of the wage tax levied by the government and cf is the ¯ring
cost. That is, ¡cf is the fall back position of the ¯rm: if the worker and ¯rm
do not reach agreement on the wage, the worker is ¯red and the ¯rm has to
pay the ¯ring cost cf. It follows from this that the worker's wage w and the




(y¡ T + cf) +(1 ¡ ¯)b (2)
¼ = (1 ¡ ¯)(y ¡ T ¡(1+ t)b)¡ ¯cf (3)
Part of the surplus y that is not distributed to ¯rm or worker goes to the
government as tax income:
taxes = y¡ w ¡¼
= tw +T
The worker and ¯rm will separate after " has been revealed if and only if
the joint surplus they generate is less than the sum of their outside options.




13That is, the ¯rm and worker always agree on when to separate: pro¯ts are
below the outside option (¡cf) if and only if wages are below the outside
option (b). It is routine to verify that this can be reformulated as follows.




y ´ (1+ t)b+ T ¡ cf (4)
Given x and e, the probability that the worker and ¯rm separate is given by
Pr
¡
x+ e +" · y
¢
= G((1+ t)b+ T ¡ cf ¡ e ¡ x) (5)
Hence, the worker and ¯rm continue after the industry shock if and only
if output y exceeds the gross wage costs of a wage equal to the unemployment
bene¯t (worker's outside option) minus the ¯ring cost (¯rm's outside option).
For given values of e;b;t and T, a rise in the ¯ring cost cf implies that fewer
matches are dissolved.
4.2 E®ort choice
In this section we derive the e®ect of the ¯ring cost on worker's e®ort invest-
ment. To do this, we write the wage rate in (2) explicitly as a function of




(x+ e +" ¡ T + cf)+ (1¡ ¯)b
What is important here is that the worker and ¯rm bargain over the wage
after the e®ort e has been sunk. In other words, there is a hold up problem.
One would expect the worker and ¯rm to look for opportunities to remove
this hold up problem. In section 4.5 we discuss what type of contractual
14incompleteness we need to assume so that the worker and ¯rm cannot solve
the hold up problem themselves.













where we assume that the e®ort costs satisfy °(0) = 0 and °0(:);°00(:) > 0.
In words, raising the e®ort level e raises the e®ort cost °(e) and has two
bene¯cial e®ects. First, as e goes up, it becomes less likely that the worker is
¯red. Second, raising e raises the wage that the worker receives if the match
is not dissolved. The ¯rst order condition for this maximization problem




















y ¡ e¡ x
¢
> 0 holds for all e ¸ 0 then equation (6) has a
unique solution.
Lemma 2 The e®ects of the ¯ring cost cf and the suitability for the job x







The intuition for these results is as follows. As cf goes up, it becomes less
likely that the worker is ¯red. Hence it becomes more likely that the e®ort
e will yield a revenue in terms of a higher wage. Similarly, as x goes up, it
becomes less likely that the worker is ¯red and hence he is more willing to
invest e®ort e.
154.3 Vacancies
In this section we determine the number of vacancies that are created in the
economy at t = 0. We write pro¯ts explicitly as a function of e and ".
¼(e;") = (1¡ ¯)(x +e + " ¡ T ¡ (1+ t)b)¡ ¯cf
Then the expected value of being matched with a worker equals
E(J) = ¡G
¡










y ¡ e ¡ x
¢¤





We assume that there is free entry into the business of posting vacancies.







µ is the probability that a ¯rm is matched with a worker.
The e®ect of cf on the number of vacancies follows from the e®ect of cf
















A rise in ¯ring costs reduces a ¯rm's expected pro¯ts for two reasons. First,
it increases the direct cost at separation and second, the wage goes up since
the ¯ring costs improves a worker's bargaining position relative to the ¯rm.
This would suggest that a rise in ¯ring costs is always bad news for the ¯rm.
The next lemma derives conditions under which that is the case. However,
there is also a positive e®ect of the ¯ring cost for the ¯rm. Higher ¯ring costs
imply a higher e®ort investment by the worker and hence a higher surplus y
to bedivided. Ife®ort e is su±ciently elastic (or equivalently, ° (:) su±ciently
linear), the last e®ect dominates and the ¯rm gains as ¯ring costs go up.
16Lemma 3 If G
¡
y ¡ e ¡ x
¢
is close to 1 then
@E(J)




The intuition for the ¯rst e®ect is as follows. The bene¯cial e®ect for the
¯rm of a rise in cf is that it raises worker's e®ort. However, if it is unlikely
that the match survives (G
¡
y ¡e ¡ x
¢
is close to 1) this e®ect on e®ort is
small. On the other hand, if it is likely that the worker has to be ¯red, a rise
in cf raises expected ¯ring costs substantially. The second result says that
there are functions ° (:) such that the elasticity of e®ort with respect to cf is
big. In that case, a small increase in ¯ring costs leads to a big rise in e®ort
and hence a big rise in a ¯rm's pro¯ts. In that case, the rise in ¯ring costs is
bene¯cial to the ¯rm.
4.4 Welfare and normative results
In themodel thereare two externalities whichcreate bene¯cial e®ects of¯ring
costs. First, there is a hold up problem which causes workers to underinvest
in e®ort. A rise in ¯ring costs induces a higher e®ort level and hence can be
welfare enhancing, even though the ¯ring cost is a pure waste from a social
point of view (i.e. it is not a transfer). Second, because of taxation the
social value of a match exceeds the private value of a match. This causes the
private parties to dissolve too many matches. Some matches are dissolved
which have a positive social value because of the tax revenues generated by
it. Introducing a ¯ring cost stops some of these matches from being dissolved
and hence can be welfare enhancing. This section derives conditions under
which the welfare maximizing ¯ring cost is strictly positive.
Welfare is de¯ned as the sum of utilities of workers and ¯rms. The ex-
pression for the expected value of a match for a ¯rm is derived in equation
(7) above. The analogous equation for expected value for a worker of being
matched with a ¯rm is
E(Ve) = ¡°(e)+ G
¡






17Welfare W can be written as
W = (1¡ m(µ))b+ m(µ)E (Ve)+ m(µ)E(J) ¡ cµ
Using the government budget constraint




y¡ e ¡ x
¢¤
b
we can write welfare as









(x + e+ ")g (")d"
#
¡ cµ
Maximizing welfare with respect to e®ort e yields that the ¯rst best e®ort
level is determined by
°
0 (e) = g
¡
y ¡ e ¡x
¢




y ¡ e ¡ x
¢¤
(11)
Simple comparison of this equation with (6) yields the following result.
Lemma 4 If t > 0 and (1 +t)b+T > 0 then the ¯rst best e®ort level exceeds
the e®ort in the private outcome
There are two reasons for this e®ect. First, there is the hold up problem
(
¯
1+t < 1): the worker bears all the cost of the e®ort e but gets only a fraction
of the gains. In particular, part of the additional output of the worker's
e®ort is shared with the ¯rm and the government. Second, the matches with
y 2 h0;(1+ t)b+T ¡cfi are dissolved because they yield no private surplus
although they do yield social surplus as y > 0. By raising e such matches
with strictly positive social value are saved.
Next we compare the socially optimal number of vacancies (or tightness)
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18Multiplying both sides with
µ
m(µ) and de¯ning the elasticity of the matching
function as ´ =
m0(µ)µ





















Comparing this equation with the market outcome in equation (9) we get
the following result.
Lemma 5 Su±cient conditions for the socially optimal tightness µ to exceed
tightness in the private outcome (see (9)) are
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The intuition for these conditions is as follows. The ¯rst inequality is
related to the Hosios condition (see Hosios (1990)) and says that the ¯rm's
bargaining power should not be too big. The reason is that creating va-
cancies causes a negative external e®ect (congestion externality): if a ¯rm
opens an additional vacancy, the probability that other ¯rms are matched
with a worker is reduced (
m(µ)
µ is decreasing in µ). If the elasticity of the
matching function ´ equals ¯rm's bargaining power (1¡ ¯) this externality
is internalized and ¯rms do not create too many vacancies from a social point
of view. Clearly, if ¯rm's bargaining power is even lower (1¡ ¯ · ´) ¯rms
are not overinvesting in vacancies either. The second inequality compares
parts of the social surplus overlooked by the ¯rm. First, tax revenues on
surviving matches do not add to the ¯rm's surplus and hence the ¯rm tends
to underinvest in vacancies. Second, part of the ¯ring cost that is subtracted
in ¯rm's pro¯ts goes in fact to the worker (cf raises worker's wages) and is
not lost from a social point of view. Finally, since the worker bears all of the
e®ort cost °(e) the ¯rm does not take this cost into account when creating
vacancies. This e®ect tends to work in the direction of the ¯rm overinvesting
19in vacancies. The inequality implies that the ¯rst two e®ects dominate the
latter and hence the ¯rm underinvests in vacancies.




for cf 2 [0; ¹ cfi where ¹ cf > 0.
This result implies that the socially optimal ¯ring cost is strictly positive,
although the ¯ring cost is a pure waste from a social point of view. The
intuition is that by raising the ¯ring cost (from cf = 0) workers' e®ort is
increasedwhich is below the social optimum andfewer matches are destroyed
which have a strictly positive social value.
This result cannot hold for all e®ort functions. Suppose for instance that
e®ort is costless until e = 1 and in¯nitely expensive for e > 1.8 Then all
workers invest the socially optimal e®ort level already and raising cf just
raises costs for the economy (as ¯ring costs are a pure waste). Hence, it
must be the case that e®ort is su±ciently elastic to changes is cf to get the
positive welfare e®ect of cf.
The welfare maximizing ¯ring cost is ¯nite, because as cf ! +1, pro¯ts
are reduced to zero and hence no vacancies will be created.
4.5 The nature of ¯ring cost and contractual incom-
pleteness
So far we have assumed that ¯ring costs are a pure waste, say paper work
needed to ¯re an employee. Alternatively, we can distinguish ¯ring cost as a
¯ringtax paidto thegovernment andseverance pay whichis a¯ring costpaid
to the employee. For each of these types of ¯ring costs we discuss here what
8That is, ° (:) is of the form: ° (e) =
(
0 if e 2 [0;1]
+1 otherwise
.
20the welfare e®ects are of a rise in the ¯ring cost and what sort of contractual
incompleteness we need to assume to defendgovernment interventioninthese
cases.
Inall threeof these cases we needtoassume that the e®ort e of the worker
is not contractible. This seems reasonable inmany circumstances. Suche®ort
costs are hard to observe and are usually not veri¯able in court. Think here
ofa worker's e®ort to cooperate with colleagues, to behavetowards customers
etc. If thise®ort level werecontractible, theholdupproblemwoulddisappear
and there would be no case for ¯ring costs.
Further, we need to assume that the ¯rm cannot commit to leaving the
gains from e®ort to the worker. For instance, the following contract would
solve the hold up problem. The ¯rm sells itself to the employee at t = 1 for
a price equal to its expected pro¯ts, thereby leaving all gains from e®ort to
the worker. This contract is infeasible if we assume that the worker has a
liquidity constraint. Again this is a reasonable assumption in most cases.
To defend government intervention in the case where the ¯ring cost is
a pure waste (created by the government), we need to answer the question
'if this ¯ring cost creates additional surplus, why don't the worker and ¯rm
write a contract themselves saying that money should be burned in case the
worker is ¯red?' There are two answers to this question. First, although the
¯ringcost may createadditional welfare, it may be the casethat the ¯rmloses
due to the ¯ring cost (i.e.
@E(J)
@cf < 0). The only way in which the worker can
induce the ¯rm to sign a contract stipulating a ¯ring cost is to compensate
the ¯rm ex ante. In other words, the worker bribes the ¯rm to sign such a
contract. Assuming that the worker has a liquidity constraint rules out such
a contract and necessitates government intervention. Another argument why
government intervention is needed even if the ¯rm would gain from the ¯ring
cost (i.e.
@E(J)
@cf > 0) is given by Nickell and Layard (1999). They claim that
adverse selection problems may be an important reason why private ¯rms in
the US do not o®er employment protection themselves. The idea is here that
there are two types of workers: one likes an easy life and job security, the
21other is willing to work hard and does not mind a bit of risk. By o®ering
(unilaterally) a contract with high cf, a ¯rm attracts disproportionately the
wrong type of worker. This makes the selection of workers very expensive.
Hence ¯rms only o®er contracts with low ¯ring costs.
Ifthe¯ring costtakes the formofa transfer tothe government (¯ringtax),
then it is less surprising that a higher ¯ring cost can raise welfare because
the ¯ring cost is not a waste from a social point of view. So in this case we
need fewer assumptions on the contractual incompleteness to make the story
work. In this case, we only need to assume that e®ort is not contractible, so
that there is a hold up problem. The ¯ring tax is then an excellent way for
the government to raise revenue as it raises e±ciency instead of decreasing
it.
If the ¯ring cost is a transfer to the employee (severance pay), it is again
easier to get a welfare enhancing rise in the ¯ring cost because it is not a
waste from a social point of view. On the question why the government needs
to stipulate such contracts, similar arguments as above can be used (adverse
selection problem; worker has liquidity constraint). Note that in this case
the level of the ¯ring cost will be lower than in the two other cases because
of the following moral hazard problem on the worker's side. One reason why
the worker exerts e®ort is to avoid bankruptcy by the ¯rm. If the worker
gets severance pay cf in case the match is dissolved, there is less incentive to
try to avoid bankruptcy since the worker now gets b +cf instead of just b.
Summarizing, to get the welfare enhancing e®ect of ¯ring cost we need to
assume that the worker's e®ort is not contractible. In order to make a case
for the government to stipulate contracts with ¯ring cost we need to assume
that either the worker has a liquidity constraint which prevents him from
bribing the ¯rm into a contract with ¯ring costs or that ¯rms face an adverse
selection problems with di®erent types of employees.
225 Simulations
In this section we illustrate the functioning of our model by means of simu-
lations. We assume that no unemployment bene¯ts are paid and there are
no other government expenditures. Therefore, there are no taxes9. Further-
more, we assume that g(²) » N(0;4): Furthermore, the other parameters are
speci¯ed as follows: ´ = ¯ = 0:5; A = 0:9; c = 2; Á = 0:1;°(e) = 1
2'e2: This
combination of parameter values ensures plausible values of unemployment
rates over a wide range of values for x. We start with x = 1:5: The ¯rst
column of Table 1 shows the simulation results with respect to a number of
relevant parameters in case ¯ring costs, cf = 0: The e®ort e = 4:7. This
induces the employers to open up many vacancies such that the matching
probability is equal to 1. Every unemployed worker meets a vacancy. How-
ever, 6.1% of the matches split up immediately after the industry conditions
are revealed. Therefore, total unemployment equals 6.1%. Pro¯ts equal 3.15
and welfare 2.73.
If ¯ring costs are introduced initially there is a decline in unemployment
and an increase in welfare. This is shown in Figure 1. The decline in un-
employment is caused by two opposite e®ects. First, because ¯ring costs
increase, pro¯ts decline and therefore less vacancies are created. This re-
duces the matching probability and has a positive e®ect on unemployment.
Second, because ¯ring costs increase, workers have an incentive to generate
e®ort, which reduces the number of matches that split-up. This has a neg-
ative e®ect on unemployment. Initially, at low ¯ring costs the second e®ect
dominates the ¯rst e®ect. However, as ¯ring costs keep increasing there is
situation where almost all matches sustain. Then, the second e®ect is obso-
lete and only the ¯rst e®ect remains. Therefore, a further increase in ¯ring
costs will increase unemployment. Figure 1 shows that under the set of pa-
rameter values chosen the optimal value of the ¯ring costs is c¤
f = 0:70: At
this level of ¯ring costs unemployment is at its lowest point and welfare is
9This approach is stylized and does not modify fundamentally the basic results.
23maximized. The second column of Table 1 shows the full simulation results
in this optimum. E®ort is now higher and less vacancies are opened. The
matching probability is still 100%. Since productivity is higher less matches
are destroyed in the optimum and the unemployment rate now equals 2.9%.
Pro¯ts are lower but because there is more employment and productivity has
increased welfare has also increased.
It is interesting to investigate whether it makes sense for employers to
o®er two types of contracts with di®erent ¯ring costs. The contract with the
high ¯ring costs resembles a permanent position (high expected duration)
while the contract with the low ¯ring cost represents a temporary position
(low expected job duration). To get both types of contracts to be o®ered by
¯rms in equilibrium we let x vary over job matches. All workers are the same
ex ante, but ex post their suitability for a job x may di®er. Some workers
are matched with a job for which they are very suitable (high x) some with
a job for which they are not suitable (low x).
We illustrate what happens if a worker is less suitable in the third and
fourth column of Table 2, where we present simulation results in case x = 1.
The third column of Table 2 presents the results in the case of no ¯ring costs.
The suitability for the ¯rm is lower but the matching probability is still equal
to 1. After the industry conditions are revealed more matches split-up than
in the previous situation. Both e®ects result in an unemployment rate of
8.1%. The fourth column of Table 2 shows the situation of optimal ¯ring
costs. The optimal ¯ring costs are lower than before, c¤
f = 1:2: Because
of the introduction of ¯ring costs workers generate more e®ort than before.
But not every match sustains. And, the low suitability induces employers
to generate less vacancies. Because of the low matching probability overall
unemployment is higher than in the case of more suitable workers. Note
that unemployment is higher with optimal ¯ring costs than it is without
¯ring costs.10 Overall welfare is higher because even though less workers are
productive, the productivity per worker is substantially higher.
10Unemployment is lowest (4.8%) if the ¯ring costs are equal to 0.9.
24The results that less suitable workers are o®ered less employment pro-
tection is intuitively clear. Note that due to the lower level of employment
protection unemployment is higher for less suitable workers. The main rea-
son for this is that for less suitable workers employers ¯nd it less worthwhile
to openup a lot ofvacancies. We conclude that for high productivity workers
the welfare maximizing contract speci¯es a high ¯ring cost. There may be a
limit to this positive relationship. If the e®ort produced without employment
protection is already high o®ering a lot of employment protection will not
increase e®ort su±ciently if the e®ort function is very steep. Then, the costs
of providing extra e®ort may be too high. So, it may be that for high levels
of x there is a negative relationship between x and c¤
f.11
This conclusion is interesting since it corresponds to the observed facts:
Low productive workers areover-representedin temporary employment(with
low ¯ring cost) relatively to long-term employment (with high ¯ring cost).
6 Conclusions
We propose in this paper a theoretical analysis of the welfare e®ects of em-
ployment protection. In our framework, the duration of the employment
contract is endogenous. Firing costs associated with an employment contract
serve as a commitment device for the ¯rm and give incentives to workers to
invest in productivity enhancing human capital. We analyze employment
protection focusing on the trade-o® between °exibility and commitment. We
start with a situation where all workers have the same productivity. We
show that for a given productivity there is an optimal degree of employment
protection. If there is a productivity distribution it is welfare improving
if di®erent types of contracts, i.e. contracts with di®erent ¯ring costs, are
o®ered.
11In the current parameter setting of Table 1 there is no negative relationship at higher
levels of x. In order to generate such a relationship a di®erent e®ort function would have
to be used.
25The optimal degree of employment protection is country-speci¯c, i.e. de-
pends on some parameter values that are speci¯c to the countries. Over the
last decade, many countries have substantially changed their employment
protection legislation, towards more °exibility essentially. It could therefore
be that they are now closer to their optimum. The important conclusion of
our paper is that the optimal ¯ring cost is in most cases larger than 0.
Finally, we show that there is a nonlinear relationship between the ¯ring
cost and unemployment which may be one of the reasons why some empirical
studies ¯nd that the employment protection legislation does not a®ect the
unemployment rate.
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7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 2



















@cf > 0 because the term in square brackets is positive due to the
second order condition for e. In a similar way one can derive @e
@x > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Clearly, if [1¡ G
¡
y¡ e ¡ x
¢
] ¼ 0, we have that
@E(J)
@cf < 0.
Substituting the expression for @e
@cf in (13) into equation (10) we get
@E(J)
@cf
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Let ^ e denote equilibrium value. Then, using a second order Taylor expan-
sion, ° (e) can be written as °(e) = °(^ e)+°0 (^ e)(e ¡ ^ e)+ 1
2Á(e¡ ^ e)
2 where
Á = °00(³) for some ³ between e and ^ e. Changing the concavity of the
function °(:) around ^ e (while keeping °0(^ e) unchanged) a®ects how elastic
e reacts to cf, but does not a®ect the equilibrium ^ e. In other words, we can
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29Proof of Lemma 5
Since cµ
m(µ) is increasing in µ (by assumption), the socially optimal number
of vacancies exceeds the private number of vacancies if and only if
´
"
¡° (e) ¡ G
¡


















y¡ e ¡ x
¢¤








If ´ ¸ 1¡ ¯ a su±cient condition for this inequality to hold is
¡°(e)¡ G
¡







y ¡ e ¡ x
¢¤
(cf ¡ T ¡ (1+ t)b)¡
cf
1¡ ¯




y ¡ e ¡ x
¢¤





Proof of Proposition 6
As shown in lemma 3, if °(:) is su±ciently elastic then we have
@E(J)
@cf > 0.
It is clear that
@E(Ve)
@cf > 0 because cf raises the wage rate. Further, Nash
bargaining implies that w(e;") ¸ b for all matches that survive. Together
with ° (0) = 0 it follows that E(Ve) > b. Hence
@E(J)
@cf > 0 implies that
@µ
@cf > 0 and hence
@[(1¡m(µ))b+m(µ)E(Ve)]
@µ > 0. Further, by choosing ° (:) such
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lemma 5 implies that the rise in µ is welfare enhancing as well. Q.E.D.
30Table 1 Employment protection in OECD countries
Strictness of Strictness of Incidence
protection against regulation of temporary
dismissals temporary empl. employment
Late 80s Late 90s Late 80s Late90s 1989 1999
Anglo-Saxon countries
United States 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 -
United Kingdom 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 5.4 6.8
Canada 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 - -
Australia 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 19.9 -
Ireland 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.3 8.6 -
New Zealand - 1.7 - 0.4 - -
Continental Europe
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 - -
Belgium 1.5 1.5 4.6 2.8 5.1 10.3
France 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.6 8.5 14
Austria 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 - 7.5
Germany 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.3 11 13.3
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 8.5 12
Northern Europe
Denmark 1.6 1.6 2.6 0.9 10 10.2
Finland 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 11.9 18.2
Norway 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8 - -
Sweden 2.8 2.8 4.1 1.6 - 13.9
Southern Europe
Greece 2.5 2.4 4.8 1.8 17.2 13
Italy 2.8 2.8 5.4 3.8 6.3 9.8
Spain 3.9 2.6 3.5 3.5 26.6 32.7
Portugal 4.8 4.8 3.4 3.0 18.7 18.6
Source: OECD, 1999
31Table 2 Simulation resultsa)
x = 1:5 x = 1:0
cf = 0:0 c¤
f = 1:4 cf = 0:0 c¤
f = 1:2
e 4.70 4.87 4.60 4.80
Prob(match) 1 1 1 0.94
G(²) 0.061 0.029 0.081 0.040
u(%) 6.1 2.9 8.1 9.3
profits 3.15 2.46 2.87 2.33
Welfare 2.729 2.754 2.217 2.248




f is the value of the ¯ring cost that maximizes welfare under the set of
parameter values chosen.
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